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Keywords: Electricity markets; Market design; Regulation; Capacity remuneration; Information provision in regulation; Security of supply; Cross-country analysis.

Capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRMs) are widely implemented as an attempt of correcting the real-world imperfections of electricity markets and aligning market outcomes with social optimality. Mainly, many observers doubt theability of the EOM to provide sufficient investment incentives to ensure the security of supply, and CRMs are expected to mitigate the risk of failure. Unfortunately, the numerous real world experiences have led to limited academic publications.In addition, the abundant theoretical literature fails to deliver clear take away messages with respect to the performance ofCRMs in real life conditions. The empirical assessment of CRMs is all the more necessary as their performance depends on a number of country-specific, structural, technical and behavioral parameters, as well on the details of implementation that structure the incentives. Reducing the literature gap from both ends, this doctoral thesis represents the first attempts to empirically discuss CRM performance and design choices. It provides a conceptual reflection on the evolution of CRM designs over time (Chapter 1) and discusses the divergences existing in the quantitative literature (Chapter 2). It also contributesto the discussion on the net cost of such intervention thanks to an econometric cross-country analysis (Chapter4). From a theoretical standpoint, an analytical model analyses the preferences for the precision of information available under different capacity market designs (Chapter 3).

Thesis summary :
https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/20573

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