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THE ECONOMIC FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER:

THE POTENTIAL FOR CONSTRUCTION COSTS REDUCTION AND THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR FLEXIBILITY

Dr. Michel BERTHELEMY


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THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR FLEXIBILITY IN LOW CARBON ENERGY SYSTEMS


NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS FOR CONSTRUCTION COSTS REDUCTION

French nuclear reactors are highly flexible



THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE FRENCH NUCLEAR FLEET TODAY: FLEET LEVEL

Today's French nuclear fleet meets most of the seasonal flexibility needs of the power mix



Source: OECD/NEA, 2011

FLEXIBILITY OF THE FRENCH NUCLEAR FLEET ALREADY SUPPORTS RENEWABLES INTEGRATION (1/2)


Since the 1980s, 75% of French nuclear power comes from nuclear
→ Nuclear cannot always produce as baseload

Nuclear supports flexibility needs at 3 levels:

- ❖ Frequency regulation (network stability)
- ❖ Consumption variability (night, weekend, summer...)
- ❖ Renewable integration (wind, solar PV)



Non-produced power available later → impact on outages planning




Today, about **1 TWh of nuclear power due to renewables**
(i.e. less than 7%)

Source: EDF

FLEXIBILITY OF THE FRENCH NUCLEAR FLEET ALREADY SUPPORTS RENEWABLES INTEGRATION (2/2)

Production – Golfech 2 – June 2013 – KU 65 %



Up to 5% nominal power / min!


A range of R&D activities support the load-following capabilities of the existing nuclear fleet:

- ❖ *Preventative maintenance program for Balance of Plant*
- ❖ *Improved water chemistry monitoring*
- ❖ *New generation of digital tools for control room operator*
- ❖




Future Gen-III NPP (EPR2 in France) to integrate flexibility needs from renewables at design stage

Enhanced load-following opportunities with LWR-SMR (e.g. design without boric acid) **but also Gen-IV reactor concepts** (e.g. no Xenon effect in SFR)

Non-electric applications to support the decarbonisation of the energy sector (e.g. nuclear cogeneration, see next slide)



NUCLEAR COGENERATION : A LONG TERM OPPORTUNITY TO DECARBONIZE THE HEAT SECTOR



Nuclear power flexibility is a reality today and already contributes to the integration of variable renewables

Understanding flexibility needs in high renewable scenarios remains a complex issue: **need for a system approach in energy economics research to better assess the value of nuclear power as part of the « flexibility mix »**

Role of R&D to further increase nuclear flexibility, primarily for Gen-III nuclear technologies and (potentially) advanced reactors concepts looking both at flexible generation and output

 **Central role of long term electricity market reforms** in order to better reflect the value of flexible power generation

THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR FLEXIBILITY IN LOW CARBON ENERGY SYSTEMS

**NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS FOR
CONSTRUCTION COSTS
REDUCTION**


Not a new topic ...

- ❖ OECD/NEA (2000) already looked at construction costs reduction
- ❖ OECD/NEA (2015) focused on supply chain issues
- ❖ Recurrent projects costs studies (CGE) with IEA

.. But important time to revisit the issue


- ❖ Many FOAK reactors commissioned in 2018/2019
- ❖ LCOE challenges with reduction of levelized costs of renewables
- ❖ Need to ramp-up nuclear new build to meet role in decarbonisation scenarios

Installed nuclear capacity in 2040 (GWe)



➔ **Core issue = near term (2030s) costs reductions for Gen-III as we move from FOAK to NOAK**

BACK TO BASICS: NUCLEAR PRODUCTION COSTS BREAKDOWN




**At a 7% discount rate → investment costs = about 2/3rd
of the levelized costs of nuclear power
(source: SFEN, 2018)**

NUCLEAR INVESTMENT COSTS BREAKDOWN

Direct costs

Indirect costs



Direct v. indirect construction costs (source: ETI, 2018)

CONSTRUCTION TIME OF RECENT FOAK GEN-III PROJECTS

	Design	Decision	Construction start	Construction time (years)			Construction completed
				Initial	Delay	Final	
OL3	EPR	2003	août-05	4	11	15	2020
FLA 3	EPR	2005	déc-07	5	7	12	2019
NovoV 2.1	VVER1200	2006	juin-08	7	1	8	2016
Leningr 2.1	VVER1200	2006	oct-08	5	3	8	2018
Sanmen 1	AP1000	2007	avr-09	6	3	9	2018
Hayiang 1	AP1000	2007	sept-09	5	4	9	2018
Shin Kori 3	APR1400	2007	oct-08	5	3	8	2016
Taishan1	EPR	2007	oct-09	5	4	9	2018
Vogtle 3	AP1000	2008	mars-13	4	2	6	2019
Fuqing 5,6	HUALONG 1	2014	mai-15	5	?	?	?

Source: SFEN, 2018

CONSTRUCTION COSTS OF RECENT FOAK GEN-III PROJECTS

	Country	Reactor	Start	MWe	Ex-ante construction cost USD/kWe	Ex-post construction costs USD/kWe
Olkiluoto 3	Finland	EPR	2005	1 x 1630	2430	> 6260 (*)
Flamanville 3	France	EPR	2007	1 x 1600	2475	7800 (*)
Leningrad 2	Russia	VVER1200	2008	2 x 1085	2673	3040
Sanmen 1,2	China	AP 1000	2009	2 x 1000	2650	2800
Taishan 1,2	China	EPR	2009	2 x 1660	1960	3150
Shin Hanul 1,2	South Korea	APR1400	2012	2 x 1325	2300(**)	2645
Vogtle 3,4	United States	AP 1000	2013	2 x 1117	5565	6800
Fuqing 5,6	China	HUALONG 1	2015	2 x 1090	2800	3500

Source: SFEN, 2018

(*) 1€ = 1,2 USD (**) = Shin Kori 3,4

WHY “MEGA” PROJECTS (SOMETIMES) FAIL? PARALLEL WITH OTHER INDUSTRIES

McKinsey, “A risk-management approach to a successful infrastructure project”

<https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-infrastructure/our-insights/a-risk-management-approach-to-a-successful-infrastructure-project>

- ❖ Large, complex, long-term projects.
- ❖ Involve a large number of stakeholders (e.g. contractors) entering the project at different stages with different roles and responsibilities.
- ❖ Significant interface risks.
- ❖ Poor project structuring and risk management.


Example	Budget vs actual, € billion		Delays and start-up problems	Incorrect capacity and revenue plans	Total value lost vs plan, € billion
	Planned	Actual			
Eurotunnel	7.5	15.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6-month delay • 18 months of unreliable service after opening 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overestimated market-share gain in freight and passengers by 200% 	~7.5
High-speed rail Frankfurt-Cologne	4.5	6.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1-year delay of construction • Legal and technical issues 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unforeseen capped government funding 	~1.5
Betuwe Line NL (cargo rail)	2.3	>5.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.5-year¹ delay of construction • Technology choices still not finalized 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annual revenue shortfall of €20 million 	~3.0
Kuala Lumpur Airport	2.0	3.5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initial issues with connectivity to downtown area • Complaints about facility hygiene levels 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Handles only ~60% of current capacity • Losing market share to Singapore 	~1.5

¹Project still not finalized and costs could go even higher.

Source: Annual reports; Jane's Airport Review; McKinsey analysis; Reuters

ENGINEERING THE LEARNING CURVE: PARALLEL WITH THE WIND INDUSTRY

Fast learning in the UK offshore wind industry




Significant improvement for key construction stages between Flamanville v. Taishan EPRs

Flamanville 3



Concrete pouring

Flamanville 3




Fixing of containment liner



CONSTRUCTION COSTS DRIVERS: LESSONS FROM RECENT GEN-III FOAK (1/2)

Figure 6. Design Completion Percentage and Total Capital Cost



Source: ETI (2018)

Key role of **design maturity**

- ❖ Partly to do with **optimistic bias** to benefit from first-mover advantage
- ❖ **Misalignment of incentives** (e.g. push construction start in order to secure funding at Vogtle)

CONSTRUCTION COSTS DRIVERS: LESSONS FROM RECENT GEN-III FOAK (2/2)




Factor for increases in overnight construction costs in the US (Source: Univ. of Chicago, 2011)

Importance of regulatory framework and industrial policy on soft costs:

- ❖ Regulatory uncertainty
- ❖ Issues with risk allocation
→ “margins on margins effect”
- ❖ Asymmetric information and transaction costs
→ “hold up” problem

Post-Fukushima safety regulations indirect impact on construction costs through delays (?)

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC INTERVENTION FOR REDUCING THE COST OF CAPITAL



Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, "Hinkley Point C", National Audit Office,
HC 40 SESSION 2017-18 23 JUNE 2017

DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF RISK FOR NUCLEAR PROJECTS

A nuclear projects covers a range of risks in a single multi-billion project

- ❖ Market risks: In Europe, electricity prices divided by 2 over the last 10 years (60 to 30 €/MWh)
- ❖ Political risks: energy policy reversal with changes in political majority
- ❖ Technical risks: costs overruns & delays

 **Need to balance risks between investors, final consumer and the State**

Two keys energy policy enablers:

- ❖ Support low carbon investments → **credible & robust CO2 price**
- ❖ Some form of **long term contract** → RAB, CfD, ..

 Conclusion SFEN study: **up to -50 % financial costs** reduction achievable for future project

KEY FACTORS FOR REDUCING CONSTRUCTION COSTS: CONCLUSIONS FROM SFEN STUDY

- 1) **Design maturity & simplification** (EPR2 project)
- 2) **Risk management** practices (including **procurement policies**)
- 3) **Energy Policy framework** (in particular for reducing **financing costs**)
- 4) **New technologies** (digital, HP concrete, modular construction, ...)
- 5) **Learning by doing + twin effect through standardization**



SFEN study: - **30 % overnight construction costs**
reduction achievable for future projects



New nuclear needed to meet our **2050 CO2 objectives** (IEA, EU, IPCC)

The nuclear industry is moving from FOAK and could deliver 'rapidly' more competitive Gen-III/III+ series reactors


- ❖ Important to capitalize on the **lessons learnt + supply chain competencies**

Need to consider together construction costs reduction and financing as key levers to reduce overall LCOE

- ❖ **Better risk allocation** between public and private stakeholders to mitigate project risks and avoid misalignment of incentives
- ❖ New nuclear = infrastructure project



(New) nuclear requires a concerted effort between the industry and policy makers



**THANK YOU FOR YOUR
ATTENTION**

michel.berthelemy@cea.fr