



# **A New Cost-reflective Tariff Structure for Sustainable Investment in the European Power Sector**

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The future of utilities: From Bankruptcy Risk to New Business Models




# Agenda

1. Analysis of the existing problems – what's special about power?
2. What are the motivations for and principles of the new design?
3. What are the implementation challenges for stakeholders?

# Why the electricity markets doesn't work like other commodity markets and lead to bankruptcy




- Most other commodity markets work by new plants being remunerated only from the wholesale / market price – why not electricity?
- **Non-storability and high demand range for required supply security are the keys**



- In electricity market fewer plants are in base load and those see lower average prices than in typical commodity market
- Wholesale price covers energy costs but only part of required peak supply costs


# Scarcity pricing will not fill the gap – at least not as reliable basis for investment




# The consequences for the utilities since liberalisation



- Massive capital destruction in Europe and bankruptcy in the USA
- Even in Texas with growing market investors have sold out at < 50% original costs
- Renewables has compounded situation but been held too responsible for the problem
- Comparison of US price developments since 2000 between regulated and unregulated markets does not speak well for liberalisation!




# Factors explaining collapse of German wholesale price since 2008



# The wholesale market is only a part of the entire electricity supply market/system

One price doing two jobs – neither correctly → highly disfunctional pricing



# What about other non-storable, low SRMC services?



- No headline price of equivalent importance to electricity wholesale price
- Telecoms – the flatrate world to which electricity is likely to move
  - Guarantee of calling virtually anyone at any time
  - Customers pay for this through fixed price
- Hotels and airlines
  - Not of the same societal importance as electricity
  - No guarantee of availability at any particular time
  - Not a homogenous product: hotels have range of comfort and locations
  - Operators have complete freedom in setting prices – can be highly discriminatory and need not be transparent
  - Availability not generally driven by random weather variations



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# Motivation and objectives for a new market design




- Development of system at lowest costs in relation to capabilities
- To strengthen the "user pays principle" separately for capacity and energy
- To increase the competition and incentives for innovation
- To improve the integration of renewables
- To ensure neutrality between decentralised and centralised investments
- To prepare the way for system-coupling – E-cars and heat-pumps

# Basic principles





- Customer price structure reflects the cost structure – producers and customers have the same incentives for investment
- Correct price signals set along full supply chain
- Set incentives from a system perspective for the best technologies and locations – whether central or decentral
- Fair sharing of risks between plant operators (all types) and customers
- Both should be equally exposed to the wholesale market and to fixed costs




# The approach and the results




 <b>Peak capacity and flexibility (€/MW/J)</b>	+	<b>Wholesale market based payments (€/MWh)</b> 
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Determine the required secure capacity by customer on a <b>decentral</b> basis</li><li>• Government determines the build-up of renewables to meet targets</li><li>• Bidding process for plant capacity (eventually technologically neutral)</li><li>• Network investment also included in process</li></ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Investors – Fixed payment for capacity(€/MW/J) + additional revenue from wholesale &amp; ancillary services market (€/MWh)</li><li>• Expected income from these markets reduce the need for annual capacity payments</li><li>• Incentive for the best location and technology</li><li>• An „investment“ market for (technology-neutral) producers will develop</li></ul>

# Connecting with the customer - short- and long-term decision horizons of both customer and plant operator



# With the proposed design the correct price signals for dispatching and investment are set



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
# Process and challenges for implementation



- Varies by country regarding transport network and renewables surcharges
- Transport and distribution – tariff needs to become full cost-structure reflective = emphasis on peak capacity booked
  - Discussions in various countries moving in this direction
- Renewables surcharge to be progressively billed as a capacity charge
  - Symmetry cost/price structure between investors and consumers
- Retailers potentially can offer any price structure, independently of the cost structure they are facing
  - **To gain acceptance for the new tariff they need to demonstrate how it will lead to reduced costs for consumers**
  - Work with customers to reduce peak load – digitalisation is the key!



# Process and challenges for implementation (ct)



- Change to the new structure progressively between 2020 and 2030
  - Will avoid sudden system shocks and enable progressive adaptation
- A critical issue is to determine how the booked peak capacity is measured and what happens if it is exceeded
  - Alternative methods– technical / system-coincident-peak etc.
  - Penalties for exceeding mainly when system is constrained; must not discourage use of zero/negative-priced power units
- Resistance will arise for two reasons
  - New system will (initially) be more complicated
  - May disadvantage low-income and very large energy consumers
- **But unless the resistance is overcome, Europe will be paying too much for its power system and will lose further international competitiveness**

# THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

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