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30ÈME SÉANCE DU SÉMINAIRE DE RECHERCHES EN ÉCONOMIE DE L’ÉNERGIE DE PARIS-SCIENCES-LETTRES

ARBITRAGE AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIORS IN REGIONAL GAS MARKETS

Mercredi 13 Avril 2016, de 16h30 à 18h30
École Mines Paris Tech
60 Boulevard Saint-Michel
75006 Paris


This seminar was held in English.

Registration can be done on the website Eventbrite:
Inscription


PROGRAMME AND PRESENTATIONS
The Seminar on Research in Energy Economics at Paris-Sciences-Lettres (PSL) is jointly organized by the CERNA (MINES PARIS TECH), the CGEMP (Université Paris-Dauphine), the Chaire European Electricity Markets (Université Paris-Dauphine), and i3 (l’Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation), members of PSL. It is animated by François LEVEQUE (MINES PARIS TECH), Dominique FINON (Chaire European Electricity Markets, CNRS-CIRED) and Patrice GEOFFRON (Director, CGEMP, Université Paris-Dauphine).

Yuri Yegorov, Faculty of Business, Wien University
Arbitrage in natural gas markets: Drivers and constraints
Présentation
Natural gas markets are characterized by an increasing role of liquefied natural gas (LNG), spot markets, along with deregulation, liberalization and growing competition in many national markets. Rising flexibility in LNG contracts’ destination clauses combined with large spreads across locations create the impression of large arbitrage opportunities. However, technical, contractual, and market restrictions, differences in LNG qualities, capacity limits in shipping, liquefaction and re-gasification, as well as high transportation costs are important barriers for any arbitrageur. Accountings for these costs and barriers, arbitrage opportunities seem to exist in particular from the low cost US to high cost regions in Europe and Japan. Since it is difficult to be satisfied with explanations by these simple economic incentives, further explanations are needed: capacity constraint (US liquefaction plants), high investment costs at the individual level, rational expectations and US government interventions, currently and in the future.


Robert Ritz, EPRG, Cambridge University
Strategic investment, multimarket interaction and competitive advantage: An application to the natural gas industry
Présentation
This paper presents a game-theoretic analysis of multimarket competition with strategic capacity investments, motivated by recent developments in international natural gas markets. It studies the competitive implications of heterogeneity in firm structure arising from asset specificity. A single-market focus confers advantage even in the absence of superior value or cost. Lower costs and a sharper organizational focus are self-enforcing in generating competitive advantage. The paper draws out the implications for core themes in strategy: the intensity of rivalry between firms, different routes to achieve competitive advantage and their interaction, as well as the degree of value capture across different markets. This establishes a novel connection between two of Porter’s generic strategies: cost leadership and focus. The model speaks to competition between pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the post Fukushima context of intensive competition on global LNG market.



Pour toute information complémentaire, veuillez prendre contact avec les organisateurs:
Dominique Finon: finon@centre-cired.fr
François Lévêque: francois.leveque@ensmp.fr
Et Patrice Geoffron: patrice.geoffron@dauphine.fr

Partenaires

Contact

Chaire European Electricity Markets
Fondation Paris-Dauphine
Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny
75775 Paris Cedex 16

Fatoumata Diallo, Coordinatrice de la CEEM :
fatoumata.diallo@fondation-dauphine.fr
+33(1)44.05.45.54

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